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high November 3, 2026

Trojanized RVTools: Python Stager Linked to UNC2465

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Vega Threat Research investigated a customer intrusion in which an administrator installed a trojanized RVTools MSI obtained through a sponsored search result. RVTools is a free inventory utility for VMware vSphere, so the lure reaches users with privileged access to vCenter and ESXi environments. A second installer sample from a public sandbox submission carries the same DeviceSync dropper alongside a SmokedHam-style dropper built from the same template, and a Russian-language developer comment describes the DeviceSync launcher as modeled on the SmokedHam one. Based on this shared tooling and on overlaps in the RVTools malvertising delivery chain, the activity is assessed with moderate confidence to be associated with UNC2465 (Storm-0241), a financially motivated actor historically tied to DarkSide ransomware and since linked to LockBit, Hunters International and Qilin operations.

Initial access begins with a Google Ads result for "rvtools" that routes through Google's ad-click redirect to a Cloudflare-fronted lookalike site. The page runs a bot check, polls a second lookalike domain and filters traffic, so the download page does not appear outside the original ad flow. The download button points to an Azure Front Door endpoint that redirects to Dropbox, where the MSI is hosted. The MSI is unsigned and its ProductName and Manufacturer values do not match RVTools, a departure from earlier UNC2465 RVTools campaigns that used EV-signed NSIS installers.

During installation, the MSI deploys the genuine Dell-signed RVTools as a decoy while a batch dropper runs in the background. The dropper uses the built-in tar utility to extract a full CPython 3.12 runtime, including pycryptodome and pythonnet, into a ProgramData folder named to resemble a Windows component, and renames the windowless interpreter to UsbService64.exe. Persistence is a one-time SYSTEM scheduled task that fires five minutes after installation and a logon-triggered SYSTEM scheduled task, both running a batch launcher through cmd.exe that starts the renamed interpreter against DeviceSync.py. The dropper also writes an HKLM Run value pointing to a shortcut that this build never creates, so that mechanism does not function.

DeviceSync is a lightly obfuscated Python stager. On first run it generates an agent ID, collects the host name, user, domain, OS version, administrative rights, running processes and system information, and registers with a Cloudflare Workers C2 over HTTPS POST, using AES-CBC with an HMAC-SHA256 tag and TLS certificate validation disabled. After registration it sleeps 72 hours by default before polling every 20 minutes, and the C2 can change both intervals, rotate the C2 address or stop the agent. In the investigated intrusion, the only C2 traffic was a burst of six short connections within 45 seconds of the first run. The stager carries an encrypted .NET assembly that it decrypts and loads in memory through pythonnet only when the C2 supplies the key, so the second stage was not recovered.

DOMAIN 6
rvtok[.]app
rvtooks[.]com
web-app-server-gqdmgecbb2e6czg3.z03.azurefd[.]net
ucc40ad187b6bd3d738f4a18a64a.dl.dropboxusercontent[.]com
red-fire-92b4.redis-3a9.workers[.]dev
rough-base-bddc.web-static-4jf.workers[.]dev
URL 1
web-app-server-gqdmgecbb2e6czg3.z03.azurefd[.]net/id-RVTools4.7.1?q=RVTools
SHA256 FILE HASH 6
4d5b1eadb300d4e0f1a8d54795866221f0036dafd780b61e558ff8658ce34ee5
6de5a18e9adf0a48e8646345b087f5d9948f7a88ad66c36079531c66af331130
f554331edda962d8c344b3101cdd8e8d066824958a024e93423dd97819d854ab
c3986133652628cbdf89c6b594401672f24430d77c2918d4381e0e80ff605677
7f0873d6cc638e2b42443e6bdfca05907e6ecebca331a2e99e21634434edb064
2552e2af5dd85791ae773c40bff51302f3095628e51fc9ef4342edf3d5583575
FILE NAME 2
DeviceSync.py
UsbService64.exe

Detections (10)

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  • Masqueraded Python Interpreter
  • Possible Cloudflare Workers Command and Control
  • Host Reconnaissance From a User-Writable Folder Process
  • Run Key Set by LOLBAS Process
  • Schtasks From Suspicious Folders
  • Schtasks Creation Or Modification With SYSTEM Privileges
  • Suspicious Command Patterns In Scheduled Task Creation
  • Potential Persistence Attempt Via Run Keys Using Reg.EXE
  • Flag processes decoding or deobfuscating data using certutil, base64, or XOR operations