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critical May 13, 2026

TeamPCP Strikes Again: TanStack, UiPath & npm Supply Chain Compromise with Wiper Daemon

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Wiz documented a coordinated supply chain attack launched by TeamPCP (Mini Shai-Hulud) on May 11, 2026, compromising 89 npm packages and two PyPI packages spanning developer tooling, enterprise automation, and AI namespaces. The npm package @tanstack/react-router alone accounts for approximately 12 million weekly downloads. The campaign builds on the preinstall-hook/Bun execution chain used in prior TeamPCP waves and adds a novel GitHub Actions vector that extracts OIDC tokens directly from runner process memory, bypassing environment-variable secret masking entirely.

The payload steals credentials from developer machines and CI/CD pipelines, including, for the first time, password vault data, and self-propagates by publishing poisoned versions of the victim's own npm packages. A novel persistence daemon wipes the user's home directory if the stolen GitHub token is revoked, so teams should remove it before rotating credentials. The Python variant adds geographic targeting: on systems with timezone or language settings indicating Israel or Iran, it rolls a random value between 1 and 6 and if it lands on 2, plays an MP3 file at full volume and attempts to delete all files in the home directory. Exfiltration uses three redundant channels, including the decentralized Session Messenger network not seen in prior TeamPCP campaigns.

SHA256 FILE HASH 4
ab4fcadaec49c03278063dd269ea5eef82d24f2124a8e15d7b90f2fa8601266c
2ec78d556d696e208927cc503d48e4b5eb56b31abc2870c2ed2e98d6be27fc96
2258284d65f63829bd67eaba01ef6f1ada2f593f9bbe41678b2df360bd90d3df
1e8538c6e0563d50da0f2e097e979ebd5294ce1defe01d0b9fe361ba3bed1898
SHA1 FILE HASH 2
e7d582b98ca80690883175470e96f703ef6dc497
12f35b1081b17d21815b35feb57ab03d02482116
DOMAIN 5
git-tanstack.com
seed1.getsession.org
seed2.getsession.org
seed3.getsession.org
filev2.getsession.org
IP ADDRESS 1
83.142.209.194
URL 1
https://git-tanstack.com/tmp/transformers.pyz
FILE NAME 7
router_init.js
setup.mjs
router_runtime.js
tanstack_runner.js
gh-token-monitor
~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.user.gh-token-monitor.plist
~/.config/systemd/user/gh-token-monitor.service

Detections (10)

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  • npm Node Lifecycle Hook Spawning Download Utility to Fetch Bun Runtime
  • npm Lifecycle Script Executing Malicious Payload via Bun Runtime
  • IDE or AI Coding Assistant Persistence Backdoor Execution
  • Token Revocation Home Directory Wipe
  • GitHub Actions Cache Poisoning via pull_request_target with OIDC Token Extraction from Runner Memory
  • GitHub Repository Created with Campaign-Specific Description Marker
  • Session Messenger (getsession.org) C2 Exfiltration — Outbound Connections from Developer Tooling
  • Self-Propagating Worm — npm Package Published via Stolen Registry Token
  • Python Payload Download from Typosquat Domain via pip or Direct HTTP Fetch