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high January 22, 2026

Qilin Ransomware Targets Pathology Associates of Saint Thomas

Source report →

On January 14, 2026, the ransomware group Qilin claimed responsibility for an attack targeting Pathology Associates of Saint Thomas, a healthcare provider in the United States. The available metadata does not indicate whether the attackers deployed ransomware to encrypt systems or if the incident was limited to data exfiltration and extortion. Qilin has stated that it possesses sensitive medical information and has threatened to publish the full dataset unless the organization initiates contact through the group’s communication channels.

The incident highlights the ongoing targeting of healthcare organizations by ransomware groups due to the high value of patient data and the critical nature of healthcare services. Potential impacts include operational disruption, regulatory and legal exposure, financial losses, and reputational harm. It is highly likely that Qilin and similar threat actors will continue to target healthcare providers, reinforcing the need for strong defensive controls, incident preparedness, and employee security awareness.

Industry reporting indicates that Qilin operators commonly gain access using stolen administrative credentials to compromise VPN or enable RDP in environments lacking multi-factor authentication. Once inside, they perform network discovery using built-in Windows tools, harvest credentials with utilities such as Mimikatz and NirSoft, and exfiltrate sensitive data using legitimate software like Cyberduck before proceeding toward broader access and potential ransomware deployment.

DOMAIN 2
regsvchst.com
holapor67.top
IP ADDRESS 2
85.239.34.91
86.106.85.36
EMAIL 2
SHA256 FILE HASH 11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 detections (6)
  • Identification of Mimikatz Execution & Artifacts
  • Attempt to Enable WDigest Clear-Text Credential Caching
  • Active Directory Discovery with PowerShell Evasion Flags
  • Registry Modification Weakening RDP Credential Protections
  • Volume Shadow Copy Deletion
  • Windows Event Log Enumeration and Clearing Attempt
Additional detection ideas (4)
  • Monitor critical registry modifications that weaken security controls
  • Alert on credential dumping via LSASS access, SAM registry reads, or DCSync
  • Detect deletion of volume shadow copies or disabling of backup services
  • Flag enumeration of domain accounts, groups, or trust relationships