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high January 28, 2026

Novel ClickFix Chain Delivers Amatera Stealer

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Industry researchers identified a sophisticated fake CAPTCHA campaign that leverages a signed Microsoft Application Virtualization (App-V) script, SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs, as a LOLBIN to proxy execution through legitimate Windows components. The attack begins with ClickFix - a social engineering prompt instructing users to manually paste and execute a command via the Run dialog, framed as a human verification check. Instead of launching PowerShell directly, the command abuses the signed Microsoft script to avoid common detection paths and naturally filters out lower-value systems since App-V components are only present on Enterprise and Education editions of Windows.

The campaign employs multiple execution gates and validation mechanisms throughout its progression, including checking clipboard contents and environment variables to ensure proper execution order and user interaction. The attack chain pulls live configuration from a public Google Calendar file, allowing attackers to update delivery parameters without redeploying earlier stages. Later stages use PNG-based steganography to deliver encrypted payloads hidden inside images, which are extracted and executed entirely in memory. The chain ultimately delivers Amatera Stealer, a well-known information stealing malware that uses layered encryption, evasive networking techniques, and modular tasking capabilities. The malware establishes command and control communication using Host header spoofing and bypasses standard Windows networking libraries through direct syscalls to avoid EDR detection.

DOMAIN 6
cdn.jsdelivr.net
sec-t2.fainerkern.ru
svc-int-api-identity-token-issuer-v2-mn.in.net
gcdnb.pbrd.co
iili.io
s6.imgcdn.dev
IP ADDRESS 1
212.34.138.4
SHA256 FILE HASH 8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 NAME 6
herf54
basic.ics
qhs9hr5gPqez.png
fOa2bcJ.png
YzkCM2.png
SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs
Library detections (3)
  • Suspicious Scripted Retrieval of ICS Calendar Files
  • PowerShell Execution via WScript with WinINet Load
  • Execution of WScript App-V Publishing script to proxy execution to PowerShell
Additional detection ideas (9)
  • Detect payloads hidden in image files via steganography — look for image downloads followed by script execution
  • Monitor signed Windows binaries used to proxy execution of untrusted code (LOLBins)
  • Detect reflective DLL injection or in-memory assembly loading without disk writes
  • Flag suspicious PowerShell execution — encoded commands, download cradles, or AMSI bypass
  • Detect encrypted C2 channels using non-standard certificates or pinned connections
  • Detect malware resolving C2 addresses from public web services (pastebins, calendars, DNS TXT)
  • Alert when users execute files downloaded from the internet lacking Mark-of-the-Web
  • Alert on execution that checks for specific environment conditions before proceeding
  • Flag network traffic using protocol impersonation to disguise C2 communications