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high May 12, 2026

ClickFix campaign uses fake macOS utilities lures to deliver infostealers

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Microsoft researchers have documented a new "ClickFix" strategy targeting macOS users, moving away from traditional malicious downloads. Attackers host fake troubleshooting blogs on platforms like Medium and Squarespace, tricking visitors into copying and pasting a Base64-encoded command directly into their Mac's Terminal. Because the user manually executes the command, the attack entirely bypasses Apple's standard Gatekeeper security checks, allowing the malware to silently install itself.

Microsoft identified three distinct variations of this attack. The "Loader" (or SHub) campaign uses a script to fingerprint the infected machine and hides its presence by masquerading as a routine Google software update. The "Script" campaign is highly stealthy, operating entirely within the computer's memory without leaving traceable files on the hard drive. Finally, the "Helper" (or AMOS) variant creates a fake system prompt to trick users into typing their Mac password, granting the malware deep, persistent control over the system every time it boots up.

Once active, all three malware variants aggressively hunt for sensitive data, quietly stealing passwords, browser history, Keychain databases, and personal documents. Furthermore, the Loader and Helper campaigns specifically target cryptocurrency holders by deleting legitimate wallet applications like Ledger, Trezor, and Exodus. They replace these with trojanized versions designed to silently drain users' funds during their next transaction.

DOMAIN 26
cleanmymacos.org
mac-storage-guide.squarespace.com
claudecodedoc.squarespace.com
macclean.craft.me
macos-disk-space.medium.com
apple-mac-fix-hidden.medium.com
domenpozh.net
rapidfilevault4.sbs
rapidfilevault4.cyou
coco-fun2.com
yablochnisok.com
datasphere.us.com
swift-sh.com
0x666.info
honestly.ink
pla7ina.cfd
play67.cc
famiode.com
rvdownloads.com
wusetail.com
aforvm.com
ouilov.com
malext.com
reachnv.com
vagturk.com
octopox.com
URL 8
https://t.me/ax03bot
https://cauterizespray.icu/script.sh
https://resilientlimb.icu/script.sh
http://138.124.93.32/contact
http://168.100.9.122/contact
http://199.217.98.33/contact
http://38.244.158.103/contact
http://92.246.136.14/contact
IP ADDRESS 2
95.85.251.177
45.94.47.204
SHA256 FILE HASH 4
9d2da07aa6e7db3fbc36b36f0cfd74f78d5815f5ba55d0f0405cdd668bd13767
7ca42f1f23dbdc9427c9f135815bb74708a7494ea78df1fbc0fc348ba2a161ae
241a50befcf5c1aa6dab79664e2ba9cb373cc351cb9de9c3699fd2ecb2afab05
522fdfaff44797b9180f36c654f77baf5cdeaab861bbf372ccfc1a5bd920d62e
FILE NAME 8
/tmp/helper
/tmp/update
/tmp/starter
~/Library/Application Support/Google/GoogleUpdate.app/Contents/MacOS/GoogleUpdate
~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.google.keystone.agent.plist
/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.finder.helper.plist
.mainhelper
.agent

Detections (10)

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  • MacOS Dscl Authonly With Plaintext Password Argument
  • MacOS SHub Stealer C2 Event Beacon
  • MacOS External IP Discovery Via Base64 Decoded Ipify
  • MacOS Killall Terminal During Active Session
  • macOS curl Downloading to /tmp/helper or /tmp/update from Shell Lineage
  • macOS curl Output Piped Directly into osascript
  • macOS LaunchDaemon com.finder.helper.plist or /tmp-Staged Plist Loaded with launchctl
  • macOS Cryptocurrency Wallet .app Bundle Overwrite by Non-Installer Process
  • macOS Hidden Mach-O Written to User Home (.mainhelper / .agent Style)