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critical May 19, 2026

Akira Dual-Platform Ransomware: Active Targeting of Finance, Healthcare, and Critical Infrastructure

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Active since March 2023, Akira is a ransomware-as-a-service group that has claimed more than 250 victims across North America, Europe, and Australia, accumulating over $42 million in confirmed ransom proceeds. The group targets organizations across critical infrastructure, financial services, healthcare, manufacturing, and education, and operates a dedicated leak site to pressure victims through double extortion. Notably, Akira deploys separate encryptors for Windows and VMware ESXi environments, meaning backup infrastructure is as much a target as production systems.

Akira gains initial access primarily through unpatched internet-facing appliances and VPN endpoints lacking multi-factor authentication, with Cisco ASA/FTD vulnerabilities and Veeam backup server weaknesses being documented entry points. Once inside, credential harvesting is a core focus: operators use public tooling like Mimikatz alongside purpose-built scripts targeting Veeam backup credentials to collect domain account material. Privilege escalation to domain administrator level follows quickly, with new accounts created to maintain persistent access alongside legitimate remote management tools like AnyDesk and covert tunnels via Ngrok.

Before deploying their encryptor, Akira operators invest time in defense evasion and data staging. Windows Defender is disabled and exclusions are added through registry modifications, while data is compressed using WinRAR and exfiltrated to cloud storage. Volume shadow copies are deleted to eliminate recovery options, after which the encryptor is deployed across Windows endpoints and ESXi hosts. Victims who pay still face the risk of public data exposure: the group publishes stolen data regardless of ransom outcome.

SHA256 FILE HASH 41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 FILE HASH 4
5961a99181df157b81d35a50eeb27f96577a2fa2
d5efaa22a74aab87d17f8666686b554e41fb389a
08cf869a19c76ca718ba80ef73636e7bc38218b8
ef328f68c6d865ba4ef4223b5d8ee9efb5667420
MD5 FILE HASH 6
57d1aeb41d9cfea4d6899724bc4b09a5
17c624693f5dd575485ec4286b0ba786
c56b31c9080b993d57c100b91d096c33
2fed7579556f01161bb1fdfd1c3e9e6c
24e19d29a47b6b5e1a39bf5e4c313194
814310fb7a59f23e3e137ee6fee04fa1
FILE NAME 8
VeeamHax.exe
Veeam-Get-Creds.ps1
qKtul.vbs
s64.dll
lck.exe
Win_locker_0234-BMMNBW-MONC.exe
level-windows-amd64.exe
Ladon.exe

Detections (10)

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  • Identification of Mimikatz Execution & Artifacts
  • LSASS Memory Dump via comsvcs.dll (rundll32)
  • User Added to Domain Administrators Groups
  • Process Connection to MEGA Domain
  • Account Created and Granted Privileged Role
  • Windows Defender Tampering in Registry via reg.exe
  • Windows Defender Folder Exclusion Added Via reg.exe
  • PSExec Execution
  • Password Spray Across Multiple Accounts